Abstract
Introduction
With the rapid development of Internet service, remote user authentication scheme becomes an important issue for practical applications. More and more network architectures are used in multi-server environments. However, it is extremely hard for a user to remember these numerous different identities and passwords when he/she uses the single-server authentication protocol to login and access different remote service providing servers. In order to resolve this problem, many multi-server authentication and key agreement schemes have been proposed.
In 2001, Li et al. [1] first proposed the concept of multi-server authentication protocol. But their scheme need large memory and high computational cost. In 2004, Tsaur et al. [2] designed a multi-server authentication scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem and Lagrange interpolating polynomial. But their scheme is subject to high communication and computation costs. In 2008, Tsai [3] proposed a multi-server authentication scheme based on the nonce and one-way hash function. 1 However, his scheme was found susceptible to the server spoofing and the impersonation attacks [4] . In 2008, Lee et al. [5] proposed an efficient remote authenticated key agreement scheme for multi-server by adopting hash function and exclusive-OR. Nevertheless, Chang et al. [6] indicated that their scheme is vulnerable to the forgery attack. In 2009, Liao and Wang [7] designed a dynamic identity based remote user authentication protocol for multi-server environment to achieve user's anonymity. However, this scheme was found to be vulnerable to insider attack, masquerade attack, server spoofing attack, and registration center spoofing attack Tao Wan is the corresponding author.
by Hsiang and Shih [8] . Wan et al. [9] analyzed that two dynamic ID based remote user authentication schemes for multi-server environment proposed by Lee et al. [10] and Li et al. [11] were susceptible to stolen smart card attack, leak-of-verifier attack and so on.
More recently, many researches have combined user's biometrics (e.g., fingerprints, irises, and hand geometry) with password and smart card to design remote user authentication scheme to enhance the level of security. The main feature of using biometric is its uniqueness. Yang et al. [12] and Yoon et al. [13] proposed biometric based multi-server authentication schemes, but they did not consider the user anonymity. Moreover, Yang et al.'s scheme need high computational cost, and Yoon et al.'s scheme was found by He [14] to be vulnerable to insider attack, masquerade attack, and stolen smart card attack.
Recently, Chuang et al. [15] introduced an anonymous biometric based multi-server authentication scheme. But Mishra et al. [16] demonstrated their scheme was vulnerable to stolen smart card attack, impersonation attack and server spoofing attack, and proposed an improved multi-server authentication scheme. However, Baruah et al. [17] found that their scheme still cannot withstand stolen smart card attack and impersonation attack, and then proposed an enhanced authentication scheme. They declaimed their scheme satisfies all the required security attributes. Unfortunately, we identify that Baruah et al.'s scheme is susceptible to key reveal attack, replay attack and smart card forgery attack.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. We review the biometric based multi-server authentication protocol proposed by Baruah et al. in Section 2. We analyze the security flaws of Baruah et al.'s protocol in Section 3. We conclude this paper in Section 4.
Review of Baruah et al.'s Scheme
Here we will review Baruah et al.'s biometric based multi-server authentication scheme. The notations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 1 .
Table 1. Notations used in the paper
Their scheme involves three participants, the user U i , the server S j and the registration center RC. Their scheme can be divided into five phases: server registration phase, user registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password change phase. We show the login and authentication phases in Figure 1 . More details are provided in the following.
Server Registration Phase
An application server S j sends a registration request along with its identity SID j to the registration center RC, if he wishes to become a registered server. Then the registration center RC chooses the master key x and the pre-shared key PSK to compute the registration center the i th user the identity of U i the password of U i the biometric of U i Pre-shared key the j th server the identity of S j the master secret key of RC a secure one way hash function Exclusive-OR operation string concatenation operation
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h(SID j ||h(PSK)) and h(PSK||x), then sends them to the application server S j using the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2) [18] .
User Registration Phase
When a new user U i wishes to access any services provided by the registered servers, he must first register himself. This registration phase consists of the following steps:
Step R1: The user U i freely chooses his identity ID i , password PW i and personal biometric BIO i , and computes R i = h(PW i ||BIO i ). Then U i sends ID i and R i to RC over a secure channel.
Step R2: RC computes
Login Phase
Step L1: U i inserts his smart card and inputs his identity ID i , password PW i and personal biometric BIO i . The smart card computes R i = h(PW i ||BIO i ), and checks whether the entered identity ID i is equal to E i R i . If it holds, the legitimacy of U i can be assured.
Step L2: The smart card computes
Afterwards, the smart card sends the login request massage {B i , M 1 , M 2 , V 1 } to the server S j via a public channel. 
Authentication Phase
Step V1: Once S j receives the login request massage
Step V2: S j computes h(N i B i ) and checks it with V 1 . If they are equivalent, S j accepts the login request. Then S j generates a nonce N j to compute
Step V3: Upon receiving the message {M 3 ,
, and compares N i with V 2 h(SK ji ||N j ). If they are equivalent, U i authenticates S j .
After the mutual authentication, U i and S j can use the current session key SK ij = h(h(ID i ||N i )||SID j ||B i ||N j ) for securing communication.
Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U i wants to change his password PW i to a new password PW i * .
Step P1: U i inserts his smart card and inputs his identity ID i , password PW i and personal biometric BIO i .
Step P2: The smart card computes R i = h(PW i ||BIO i ), and checks whether the entered identity ID i is equal to E i R i . If it holds, U i chooses a new password PW i * to compute
Step P3: The smart card stores C i * , E i * to replace C i , E i respectively.
Security Analysis of Baruah et al.'s scheme
In Baruah et al.'s scheme, every servers has different secret information h(SID j || PSK), so their scheme can successful thwart server masquerading attack. Unfortunately, we find that their scheme still has many vulnerabilities. Any registered but malicious user can not only derive the session key between any user and server by eavesdropping their communication information in public channel, but also masquerade as the user to log into the server. In addition, when a registered but malicious user colludes with a server, they can successful log into any server by forging smart card.
Key Reveal Attack
From the login phase of Baruah et al.'s scheme, we find that each registered user knows h(PSK). If a legal but malicious user U z can eavesdrop the valid login request message {B i , M 1 , M 2 , V 1 } of U i and the authentication message {M 3 , V 2 } of S j on the public channel, he can compute h (ID 
. Then U z easily derive the current session key SK ij shared between U i and S j . After that, the attacker U z can decrypt all encrypted information between U i and S j .
Replay Attack
From the above analysis, we know that any legal user U z can retrieve h(ID i || N i ) by eavesdropping the login request message {B i , M 1 , M 2 , V 1 } of U i . Then U z can also replay the message {B i , M 1 , M 2 , V 1 } to S j . This verification holds, since the messages has not been modified. Then S j selects a nonce N j ', generates the session key as SK ij ' = h(h(ID i || N i ) || SID j || B i || N j '), and computes the authentication messages
At last, the legal but malicious user U z successful masquerade as U i to log into the server S j .
Smart card Forgery Attack
As shown in Baruah et al.'s scheme, any registered server has the same
Figure 2. Smart Card Forgery Attack on Baruah et al.'s Scheme
Information h(PSK || x) and any registered user can derive the information h(PSK). Under the condition that the registered but malicious user U z colludes with the registered but malicious S k , they can forge a smart card to log in to any registered server (e.g., S j ) without knowing the personal biometric as show in Figure  2 . The procedure is as follow:
• forge a new identity ID A , password PW A and personal biometric BIO A , and forge a master key x'.
• insert the forged smart card and input identity ID A , password PW A and personal biometric BIO A . Obviously the legitimacy of user can be assured. 
